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We used the virtual hand illusion paradigm to study how sense of agency and sense of (body) ownership can interact
with different emotional events on stress feelings. Converging evidence for at least the partial independence of agency
and ownership was found. For instance, sense of agency was a better predictor of individual anxiety levels than sense of
ownership and males showed stronger effects related to agency—presumably due to gender-specific attribution styles
and empathy skills. Moreover, agency and ownership also interacted with emotional events and led to different anxiety
levels. Taken together, our findings suggest that the disentangled sense of agency and sense of ownership can interact
with different emotional events and influenced stress feelings more in threatening situations than awarding ones.
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Empathy abilityBackground
“Were the size of my hand, such as its length, width,
span, etc. given to me as inalterably fixed, the attempt at
empathy with any hand having different properties
would have to fail because of the contrast between them.
But actually empathy is also quite successful with men's
and children's hands which are very different from mine,
for my physical body and its members are not given as a
fixed type, but as an accidental realization of a type that
is variable within definite limits. On the other hand, I
must retain this type. I can only empathize with physical
bodies of this type; only them can I interpret as living
bodies. This is not yet an unequivocal limitation.”
—Edith Stein, 1916
The phenomenon of rubber hand illusion was first re-
ported by Botvinick and Cohen (Botvinick & Cohen,
1998) in which a rubber hand was placed in front of the
participants while their own hands were hidden from
sight. As long as there were synchronous touches that
existed on both rubber hand and real hand, a perceptual* Correspondence: anti-monist@163.com
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifillusion would be felt. Besides recognizing the fake
model hand as being part of their own body, participants
also reported that they felt as if the touch they sensed
originated from the location on the rubber hand where
they saw the brush touching the rubber hand, rather
than from their real hand (Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson,
2008). Furthermore, recent studies show below rubber
hand illusion implicate that the brain is capable of inte-
grating “natural” visual input and direct cortical-
somatosensory stimulation to create the multisensory
perception that an artificial limb belongs to one’s own
body (Tsakiris, 2017; Collins et al. 2017).
This method is widely used, with minor alternations,
to induce illusions and investigate individual self-
perception of the body which is critically important for
conscious experience of the self (Folegatti, Farnè, Sale-
mme, & Vignemont, 2012; Germine, Benson, Cohen, &
Hooker, 2013; Jenkinson, Haggard, Ferreira, & Fotopou-
lou, 2013; Ocklenburg, Peterburs, Rüther, & Güntürkün,
2012). Sense of agency and sense of ownership are con-
sidered to be two main aspects of minimal self which ac-
cording to Gallagher is a basic, immediate, or primitive
“something” that we are willing to call a self (Gallagheris distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
Chen et al. Psicologia: Reflexão e Crítica  (2017) 30:17 Page 2 of 112000a, b) and thus enables us to capture the most primi-
tive sense of self (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010). There are
numerous empirical and theoretical researches using the
rubber hand illusion paradigm to study the distinction
between sense of agency and sense of ownership in
order to explain how we perceive ourselves.
Sense of agency refers to the pre-reflective experience
or sense that I am the cause or author of the movement,
while sense of ownership is the pre-reflective experience
or sense that a limb is part of one’s body (Tsakiris,
Schuetz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007; Tsakiris, 2017). In
normal experience of voluntary or willed action, sense of
agency and sense of ownership coincide and are indistin-
guishable; in the case of involuntary movement, how-
ever, it is quite possible to distinguish these two senses
(Gallagher, 2000a, b). The distinction between sense of
agency and sense of ownership has attracted consider-
able interests in various fields including psychology,
philosophy, and cognitive science (Blakemore, Wolpert,
& Frith, 2002; Marcel, 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005;
Chen, 2016). Although different methodologies we may
find in different disciplines, there is a growing consensus
on this division between sense of agency and sense of
ownership. According to experimental research on nor-
mal subjects, sense of agency for action is based on that
which precedes action and translates intention into ac-
tion while sense of ownership for motor action can be
explained in terms of ecological self-awareness built into
movement and perception (Gallagher, 2000a, b). Zhang
and Chen (2016) adopted distance reference as a new fac-
tor to investigate the plasticity of the body image. Their
study found that distance reference frame influenced peo-
ples’ perception of their own body. The size of the owner-
ship illusion varied as a function of relative rather than
absolute location of the virtual hand. The result suggests a
considerable degree of plasticity of the body image under-
lying our body ownership. Haggard, by considering the
logic of involuntary movement where there is a sense of
ownership but no sense of agency, suggested that in ordin-
ary voluntary movement, the sense of ownership is gener-
ated by sensory feedback, while the sense of agency is
generated by or at least linked to the motor commands
sent to the muscles and the accompanying efferent copy
that is internally processed within the predictive models of
the motor system (Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, Schuetz-
Bosbach & Gallagher, 2007).
There have been several studies which focused on the
differences between sense of agency and sense of owner-
ship that clearly dissociated these two experiences. For
example, Santo and Yasuda, by manipulating the dis-
crepancy between the intended and actual consequences
of actions, found that a discrepancy between predicted
and actual feedback had significant impacts on sense of
agency but no effects on sense of ownership (Sato &Yasuda, 2005). Tsakiris and colleagues, using a video-
screen-based setup, discovered that the types of proprio-
ceptive drift differed among different situations. They
found localized proprioceptive drifts for tactile and pas-
sive stimulation but not for active movement, which
means a purely proprioceptive sense of ownership is
local and fragmented but the motor sense of agency in-
tegrated distinct body parts into a coherent, unified
awareness of the body (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard,
2006). Longo and colleagues, using a 27-item question-
naire which was designed based on qualitative research
with five participants, estimated participants experience
after they were stroked synchronously or asynchron-
ously. Their results suggested that ownership and agency
are two of those subcomponents of embodiment (Longo
et al., 2008). Kalckert and Ehrsson, using a moving rub-
ber hand setup, varied the relative timing of the figure
movements, the mode of movement, and the position of
the model hand. The results that asynchrony eliminated
both agency and ownership and passive movements
abolished the sense of agency but not the ownership
while incongruent positioning the model hand dimin-
ished ownership but not agency provided evidence for a
double dissociation of sense of agency and sense of own-
ership, suggesting they may represent distinct cognitive
processes (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). There are also
studies providing empirical evidence about such dissoci-
ation in terms of neural correlates. Tsakiris et al., using
fMRI, investigated the sensory and motor aspects of
body-representation in the brain. Their findings sup-
ported the idea that agency and body ownership are
qualitatively different experiences, triggered by different
inputs, and recruiting distinct brain networks (Tsakiris,
Longo, & Haggard, 2010).
Besides rubber hand illusion and its revised version,
virtual hand illusion is another way to induce body per-
ception illusion. In the experiment of virtual hand
illusion, participants sit in front of a screen where a vir-
tual 3D image of the virtual hand would be presented
while having tactile stimulation on their real hidden
hand. It is indicated that the way of inducing virtual
hand illusion can achieve the same effect as what rubber
hand illusion did. In other words, imposing the same
tactile stimulation on both the virtual hand on the
screen and the real hand which is hidden from view can
let the participants feel the similar experience to that
under rubber hand illusion condition (Ma & Hommel,
2013; Zhang & Chen, 2016). Experiment showed that by
simply manipulating the temporal delay between partici-
pants’ real movement and the movement of the virtual
hand on the screen, a virtual hand illusion can be in-
duced even in the absence of tactile stimulation (San-
chez-Vives et al., 2010). Slater et al. found that there
were reliable correlations between the impression of
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(EMG) activation, suggesting a connection between per-
ceived ownership and action control (Slater, Perez-
Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008).
No matter what method is used, researches in this area
paid more attention to the relationship between sense of
agency and sense of ownership rather than how sense of
agency and sense of ownership can affect our higher cogni-
tion, such as emotional experiences (Guterstam, Abdulk-
arim, & Ehrsson, 2015; Christensen, Yoshie, Di, & Haggard,
2016). Though there have been already some studies using
this paradigm of virtual hand illusion to investigate the re-
lationship between sense of ownership and the affective
resonance in facing with different kinds of emotional
events. Yuan and Steed designed an experiment to measure
skin conductance responses (SCR) to what they considered
threats to a virtual hand and found similar elevations as
with rubber hands. Participants were asked to play games
in virtual environment by operating the hand of an avatar.
During the game, a virtual lamp would fall on the virtual
hand operated by the participants at some point, which in-
duced a reliable increase in SCR. They placed the hand
with an arrow as the control condition which produced sig-
nificantly less increase in SCR. Taken together, they sug-
gested that people emotionally “care” about what they
perceive as being a part of their body but not, or not so
much, about what they perceive as belonging to the body
of someone else (Yuan & Steed, 2010). However, Ma and
Hommel thought that two aspects of Yuan and Steed’s
study might help explaining this seeming discrepancy. For
one, they did not use the standard synchronization tech-
nique to induce different degrees of body ownership. For
another, the threatening event merely consisted of a virtual
lamp falling on the virtual hand. Even though the contact
between the lamp and the hand was clearly visible to the
participant, it is difficult to judge from the visual display
how much pain. Ma and Hommel adopted the standard
synchronization technique to induce the illusion of owner-
ship and replaced the falling of a virtual with a knife. Their
findings suggested that ownership was stronger if the vir-
tual hand moved synchronously with the participant’s own
hand, but this effect was independent from whether the
hand was impacted or threatened. In other words, in the
face of threats, affective resonance was independent of syn-
chronicity (Ma & Hommel, 2013).
However, we think there are still some problems that
need to be dealt with. As two main aspects of minimal
self, sense of agency and sense of ownership are con-
nected with each other in a complex way. Two common
models are existing in terms of the relations of senses of
agency and ownership. In an “additive” model, agency
and ownership are strongly related, while an“indepen-
dent” model holds agency and ownership differ in expe-
riences quanlitatively (Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard,2010). Even though they have been approved to be
driven by different kinds of information and related to
different psychological functions (Tsakiris, 2017), it is
necessary to consider both of these two experiences
when studying how bodily states can affect emotional
feelings. The available evidence can be taken to suggest
that ownership and agency are strongly related to
affective reactivity (Ma, Lippelt, & Hommel, 2017); how-
ever, it is more common to use emotional variables as
stimuli to investigate their impact on agency and owner-
ship but not vice versa. In the present study, we tried to
investigate how different situations of sense of agency
and sense of ownership could interact different emo-
tional events in terms of stress feelings.
We carried out two experiments. Experiment 1 aimed
to find out how sense of agency and sense of ownership
can affect participants’ anxiety after they performed cer-
tain type of task in terms of different genders. Experiment
2 further divided the tasks into two types (positive and
negative feedbacks, respectively) to study how disen-
tangled sense of agency and sense of ownership can inter-




The participants were 96 undergraduate students (48 fe-
males, 48 males) from four universities in Zhejiang and
Nanjing, China, who were unfamiliar with rubber/virtual
hand illusion and took part in this study voluntarily. The
age of the participants ranged between 18.24 and 29.67
(M = 21.32, SD = 2.54). All the participants were right
handed with normal naked or corrected visual acuity.
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the
relevant university ethics committee, and informed writ-
ten consent was obtained from all subjects.
Material
The study was performed in a virtual environment, which
was programmed by VB.NET. A virtual human hand or
cat claw was presented on the screen (see Fig. 1b, c). The
mouse was placed in front of the screen but shielded by a
special box.
This experiment was composed of two parts. In the first
part, a virtual human hand or cat claw was presented on the
screen moving either strictly in accordance with the move-
ment of the mouse or slightly delayed (350 to 500 ms), and
the participants were asked to observe the movement of the
virtual human hand/cat claw while moving the mouse with
their right hands for 3 min (see Fig. 1a). According to our
previous study, the treatment as in part 1 can be used to in-
duce sense of agency and sense of ownership, respectively.
The synchronicity manipulation can induce sense of agency,
while the modality had a strong effect on sense of
Fig. 1 Experiment and virtual images. a experimental facilities. b human hand. c cat's claw
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the first part. In the second part, there were knives and coins
falling down the screen, and the participants needed to catch
coins as well as avoid knives. After finishing the task, the
participants were asked to answer some questions which we
adopted from the State-Anxiety Inventory (S-AI) to evaluate
their anxious level (see Fig. 2).
Questionnaire
We adopted the reverse scoring questions from the S-AI
to access participants’ anxiety level after the treatment of
experiment 1 (see Table 1). The S-AI is a self-report
questionnaire that consists of 20 items for measuringFig. 2 Setup of experiment 1state anxiety (Spielberger et al. 1983). The Chinese ver-
sion of the S-AI demonstrates satisfactory reliability and
validity with regard to Chinese populations (Shek, 1988;
Zheng et al. 1993). For the State-Anxiety Inventory
(STAI), Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for internal
consistency in our sample is acceptable (α = 0.87).
Procedure
There were three factors in this experiment: synchron-
icity (synchronous vs. asynchronous), modality (human
hand vs. cat claw), and sex (female vs. male). The
purpose of this experiment was to study whether differ-
ent situations of agency and ownership will affect
Table 1 Questions from State-Anxiety Inventory
1 I feel calm. 11 I feel self-confident.
2 I feel safe, secure. 12 I feel nervous, irritable.
3 I feel tense, nervous. 13 I feel scared, alarmed, afraid.
4 I feel stressed. 14 I feel uncertain.
5 I feel peaceful, good about myself. 15 I am relaxed, at ease.
6 I feel upset, overwhelmed. 16 I am satisfied.
7 I worry over possible misfortunes. 17 I am anxious, worried.
8 I feel happy. 18 I feel disconcerted, disoriented.
9 I feel frightened. 19 I feel collected, composed.
10 I feel at ease. 20 I feel pleasant, in a good mood.
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warding/punishing task, namely how sense of agency
and ownership will influence people’s feeling when fa-
cing task which involved emotional feedbacks. An early
consistent finding of Witkin’s investigation of individual
differences in perception was that women tend to be
more field dependent than men (Witkin et al., 1962).
And previous study also confirmed that women tend to
use an external strategy of explanation while men orient
themselves towards something internal (Sørensen, 2005).
Therefore, we added sex as another factor, which made
the experiment a three-factor between-subjects design.
The movement between the virtual image and the par-
ticipant’s real hand was either synchronous or asyn-
chronous, and the virtual image was either a human
hand or a cat claw, except for the participants who
needed to perform a catching/avoiding task after moving
their real hands and watching the movements of the vir-
tual image on screen for 3 min. The participants saw vir-
tual coins and knives coming down from the top of the
screen, and what they needed to do was to catch as
many coins as they can and meanwhile avoid the cut of
the falling knives. The scores of their performance ap-
peared on the top right corner of the screen during the
whole task. Catching a coin or avoiding a knife wouldFig. 3 The results of experiment 1add a point while losing a coin or being cut by a knife
would lose a point. There were eight situations in this
experiment. Each participant encountered one. They
were asked to play this catching/avoiding game for
2 min. At the end of the task, there would be a message
printed on the screen which told them the results of
their performances. After the experiment, the partici-
pants needed to fill out the S-AI.
Results and discussion
Considering that anxiety level may not be so sensitive to
measure, especially for those statements describing their
anxious states, so we only calculated the results of those
reverse scoring statements (No. 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16,
19, 20) of the S-AI. Thus, the anxiety score of this study
was the sum of standard scores for question 1, 2, 5, 8,
10, 11, 15, 16, 19, and 20.
The mean ratings for anxiety were submitted to a
2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with the three factors which are syn-
chronicity (synchronous vs. asynchronous), modality (human
hand vs. cat claw), and sex (female vs. male) (see Fig. 3).
There were significant main effects of the type of synchron-
icity and modality (F (1, 95) = 48.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.55
and F (1, 95) = 6.35, p < 0.014, η2p = 0.20, respectively). The
participants showed a stronger sense of anxiety for
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views (M = 21.13, SD = 5.31) and also a stronger sense of
anxiety for human hand (M = 25.52, SD = 5.66) than cat
claw views (M = 23.19, SD = 5.86). From the result of pilot
study, we know synchronicity affected sense of agency and
modality affected sense of ownership, which means the more
sense of agency and sense of ownership during the task, the
stronger the sense of anxiety. The effect of synchronicity on
anxiety was more dramatic than that of modality which indi-
cated the feeling of controlling something would put more
pressure on participants than the feeling of owning
something.
The interaction between synchronicity and sex was also
significant (F (1, 95) = 8.03, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.64). This inter-
action effect suggested there were stronger effects related
to sense of agency for male (M = 28.00 for synchronous
and M = 18.92 for asynchronous) when compared with fe-
male participants (M = 27.17 for synchronous and
M = 23.33 for asynchronous). There were similar results
when we looked into the effects of modality on anxiety in
terms of sex. There was also a difference between males
(M = 23.96 for human hand and M = 22.96 for cat claw)
and females (M = 27.08 for human hand and M = 23.42 for
cat claw). Stronger effects related to sense of ownership
was found, although the difference is not significant (F (1,
95) = 2.072, p = 0.154). These effects differed between the
sexes. Sense of agency influenced male more than female
while sense of ownership had the vice versa effect. Males
seemed to prefer inner attribution which made them feel
more anxiety about their performance during the catch-
ing/avoiding task whenever they had a strong sense of
agency. This result is consistent with a previous study
showing that compared to the group of men, women use
an external strategy of explanation (Sørensen, 2005). A
number of studies had substantially confirmed such indi-
vidual differences in perception that women tend to be
more field dependent than men (Witkin et al., 1962). Be-
cause women are more likely to do external attribution
while men prefer internal attribution (Rim, 1990; Wang
et al. 2013), when dealing with the emotional feelings
aroused by the rewarding/punishing task, the attribution
style of female helped them to ease.
Experiment 1 indicated that sense of agency and sense
of ownership had significant effects on people’s anxiety
after performing the task which involved positive and
negative feedbacks. Interestingly, the results of experi-
ment 1 also showed the effects of agency and ownership
on perceived anxiety were different, which suggested
that the informational bases for these two judgments do
not entirely overlap, showing a discrepancy between
ownership and agency (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Kalck-
ert & Ehrsson, 2014). Also, previous studies showed that
people experience more anxiety in the face of threat tar-
geting a virtual effector that they also perceive moreownership for (Ma & Hommel, 2015; Zhang & Hommel,
2016); in order to know more about how positive and
negative events can interact with sense of agency and
sense of ownership in terms of anxiety, we performed
experiment 2 which was very similar with experiment 1
except each participant was assigned to only one kind of
task, catching coins or avoiding knives.
Experiment 2
Participants
The participants were 96 undergraduate students (48 fe-
males, 48 males) from four universities in Zhejiang and
Nanjing, China, who were unfamiliar with rubber/virtual
hand illusion and took part in this study voluntarily. The
age of the participants ranged between 17.89 and 27.90
(M = 21.04, SD = 2.34). All the participants were right
handed with normal naked or corrected visual acuity.
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the
relevant university ethics committee, and informed writ-
ten consent was obtained from all subjects.
Material
Experimental setup was almost the same as of experi-
ment 1, except for the content of the task. In experiment
1, after 3-min virtual hand illusion treatment, the partic-
ipants were asked to perform a 2-min task which was
catching coins while avoiding knives. However, in this
experiment, there was only one type of task for each par-
ticipant, which means for each participant, what he or
she encountered was either the catching coins task or
the avoiding knives task. After the end of the task, the
participants were asked to fill out the S-AI (see Fig. 4).
Questionnaire
The same questionnaire as in experiment 1 was used in
this experiment.
Procedure
There were three factors in this experiment: synchronicity
(synchronous vs. asynchronous), modality (human hand
vs. cat claw), and event (catching coins vs. avoiding
knives). Because the difference between the sexes was not
significant in experiment 1, for this experiment, we did
not consider sex as a factor any more. The purpose of
this experiment was to study how different tasks will
interact with different situations of agency and owner-
ship, namely how sense of agency and ownership will
influence people’s feeling when facing different emo-
tional events.
The procedure was very similar to that in the experi-
ment 1, the movement between the virtual image and
participant’s real hand was either synchronous or asyn-
chronous, the virtual image was either a human hand or
a cat claw, and the task participants needed to perform
Fig. 4 Setup of experiment 2
Chen et al. Psicologia: Reflexão e Crítica  (2017) 30:17 Page 7 of 11was either catching coins or avoiding knives. After the
beginning of the experiment, the participants were asked
to move their hand and watch the movement of the vir-
tual image for 3 min, which was meant to induce their
sense of agency or sense of ownership. After that, they
would either see coins or knives falling on the screen,
and what they needed to do was to catch as many coins
or avoid the cut of the falling knives. The same as in ex-
periment 1, there were scores of their performance dis-
played on the top right corner of the screen during the
task. Catching a coin or avoiding a knife would add a
point while losing a coin or being cut by a knife would
lose a point. There were eight situations in this experiment.
Each participant encountered one. At the end of the task,
there would be a message printed on the screen which told
them the results of their performances. After the experi-
ment, the participants needed to fill out the S-AI.
Results and discussion
As in experiment 1, the anxiety score of the second ex-
periment was also the sum of the standard score for
those reverse scoring statements.
The mean ratings for anxiety were submitted to a
2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with the three factors which are syn-
chronicity (synchronous vs. asynchronous), modality
(human hand vs. cat claw), and event (catching coins vs.
avoiding knives) (see Fig. 5). There were significant main
effects of synchronicity, modality, and event (F (1,
95) = 32.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.41, F (1, 95) = 13.01,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.28, F (1, 95) = 10.60, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.25, respectively). The participants showed astronger sense of anxiety for synchronous (M = 25.98,
SD = 4.96) than asynchronous views (M = 21.23,
SD = 4.65), a stronger sense of anxiety for the human
hand (M = 25.10, SD = 5.65) than the cat claw
(M = 22.10, SD = 4.61), and also a stronger sense of anx-
iety for avoiding knives (M = 24.96, SD = 6.62) than
catching coins (M = 22.25, SD = 3.18). The results of
main effects suggested the sense of controlling one’s
own movement, the sense of ownership over the moving
body part, and a threaten event can put more stress on
an individual. The participants who needed to avoid
knives in the synchronous human hand condition re-
ported the highest anxiety through the questionnaire.
Besides, the interaction among synchronicity, event
and modality was also significant (F (1, 95) = 5.54,
p = 0.021, η2p = 0.57). Avoiding knives in synchronous
human hand condition led the participants to gain the
highest anxiety score (M = 32.08, SD = 3.655) while
catching coins in asynchronous cat claw made the lowest
anxiety score (M = 19.67, SD = 2.060).
The second experiment provided evidence for the
interaction among sense of agency, sense of ownership,
and emotional events. Overall, avoiding knives in syn-
chronous human hand condition produced the highest
anxiety score while catching coins in asynchronous cat
claw had the lowest anxiety score. As in experiment 1,
synchronicity and modality significantly affected anxiety,
and there is no relevance to the type of the task. Besides
that, the results also revealed that different emotional
events influenced stress feelings differently. It was easier
to arouse higher anxious feelings in the participants
Fig. 5 The results of experiment 2
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than when catching coins. That was due to the affective
effects of emotional events on stress feelings. The ability
of detecting, identifying, and avoiding threats are more
important for our survival than gaining awards (Boyer &
Bergstrom, 2011; Nairne & Pandeirada, 2016). Moreover,
we also found both synchronicity and modality had
more influences on punishing than on awarding, which
suggested when the condition was taken as not so rele-
vant to themselves, the corresponding anxiety level
would substantially descent for threatening than award-
ing. There was also an interaction among sense of
agency, sense of ownership, and emotional events, which
fits with the claim that self-perception will be processed
hierarchically with multimodal areas processing the con-
fluence of “self” information from different sensory sys-
tems and explaining away the surprising incoming
sensory information from unimodal areas (Apps & Tsa-
kiris, 2014).
Results and discussion
As two major components of minimal self, sense of
agency and sense of ownership have attracted more and
more study interests. These basic aspects of an individ-
ual’s self-perception of the body are critically important
for self-consciousness, subjective embodiment, and self-
other discrimination. The traditional paradigm of rubber
hand illusion, because of its ability to create a sense of
ownership over external effector that does not belong to
the participant’s own body, has been a popular research
method of the problem “self.” By adopting moving factor
into traditional rubber hand illusion, moving rubber
hand illusion (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012) or virtual hand
illusion (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006) makes it
possible to study both sense of agency and sense of owner-
ship at the very same time. Previous studies focused more
on the differences of sense of agency and sense of owner-
ship or on which component is more fundamental; fewresearches paid attention to how these two basic experi-
ences could affect individual’s emotional states. It is pos-
sible that they may even affect how we perceive the outside
world or how we feel about or react to different emotional
events, which contribute to series of physiological changes
in the brain (Guterstam, Abdulkarim, &Ehrsson, 2015;
Christensen, Yoshie, Di, & Haggard, 2016).
In the present study, we investigated how disentangled
sense of agency and sense of ownership can interact with
different emotional events on stress feelings. Taken to-
gether, our findings suggest four conclusions.
First, people experience more anxiety over virtual ef-
fector that looks more similar to their own hand. As we
can tell from the results of the pilot study, the lack of
similarity does not prevent people from experiencing
agency, but it does lead to reduced anxiety even in syn-
chronous conditions. This suggests our anxious feelings
at least partially depend on our pre-existing internal rep-
resentation of one’s own body shape. Such result is con-
sistent with the claim that the experience of body
ownership may represent a critical component of self-
specificity as evidenced by the different ways in which
multisensory integration in interaction with internal
models of the body can actually manipulate important
aspects of the self (Tskiris et al., 2010).
Second, people experience more anxiety over virtual ef-
fector that they perceive as if they can control. We sys-
tematically found increased anxiety scores in conditions
with synchronous relationships between virtual images
and real hands. As these conditions also increase the per-
ception of sense of ownership, it makes sense to assume
that bottom-up information (provided through synchrony)
and top-down information (provided by modality) are in-
tegrated into a coherent percept (Zhang & Hommel,
2016). The sense of agency and sense of ownership as two
major components of minimal self existing in the process
of self-other recognition affect the higher level emotional
experience via bodily self-perception (Zhang & Li, 2016).
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stricted to threat conditions. As compared to avoiding
knives, catching coins produced rather low anxiety levels
overall. This result fits with the framework effect and sup-
ports the theory that thinking about function is an import-
ant component of the survival processing effect proposed
by evolutionary psychologists (Bell, Röer, & Buchner, 2015).
Fourth, modality affects women more than men while
synchronicity affects men more than women. There is evi-
dence to suggest that attributional style (AS) (it refers to
the style an individual uses to explain previous positive
and negative life events) and sense of agency/ownership
are related. Baumeister and Brewer (2012) demonstrated a
positive correlation between internal Locus of Control (at-
tribution of the cause of life events to the self ) and sense
of agency. Men were more likely to believe they can con-
trol their action (“internals”) than women. Men respond
most favorably to synchronicity with either the human
hand or cat claw, and this favorable response is mediated
by self-referencing. In contrast, women feel more sensitive
about their own bodily modality which was reflected in
the outside world (“externals”) either with synchronicity
or not and only happen in the response to the human hand.
Conclusions
The dissociation of sense of agency and sense of owner-
ship is for sure, but how these two senses interact with
each other is not clear enough. Data from behavioral ex-
periments support the additive model, which indicates
that sense of agency seems to promote the integration of
the sense of ownership, pure sense of ownership is frag-
mentary, and sense of agency can integrate different body
parts into a continuum and form a unified body awareness
(Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Synofzik et al, 2008;
Stein, 1964). However, brain imaging experiments are
more supportive of the independent model, according to
which sense of agency and sense of ownership are essen-
tially different experiences, triggered by different inputs,
and using different brain networks, there is no direct over-
lap (Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010). From our point of
view, such inconsistency may lie in the experimental de-
sign. Since we usually experience sense of agency with
sense of ownership, the role of these two types of experi-
ences may not be separated in normal behavioral experi-
ments. Through our research, we can find that when
sense of agency and sense of ownership were properly sep-
arated, the results obtained are consistent with the hy-
pothesis proposed by the independent model. However,
our findings do not support claims that sense of agency
and sense of ownership have no interactions. The inter-
action of modality and synchronicity had a significant im-
pact on sense of ownership rather than sense of agency,
indicating sense of agency seems to increase sense of own-
ership but not vice versa.Besides the relationship between sense of agency and
sense of ownership, our study can also provide inspir-
ation for minimal self and narrative self. Some philoso-
phers suggested important distinctions between minimal
self, a self devoid of temporal, and narrative self, which
involves personal identity and continuity across time
(Gallagher, 2000a, b). As we explained above, our hy-
pothesis is mainly based on minimal self which can be
further divided into two components, sense of agency
and sense of ownership. However, this research can also
help us to understand the relationship between minimal
self and narrative self. According to the results of the
first experiment, both higher sense of agency and sense
of ownership produced higher anxiety scores, which in-
dicates that current experience or perception of our
body will influence higher level cognition of emotion.
Further, from the second experiment, we can see such
effect only exists in the task of avoiding knives, which
suggests cognition, bodily sense of self, and emotional
experience are at least based on partly overlapping infor-
mation. Taken together, these two experiments can be
taken to indicate such a possibility that emotion is prob-
ably the key component for binding minimal self and
narrative self (Medford, 2012). In fact, this idea can be
tracked back to William James who proposed a similar
standpoint in The Principle of Psychology. According to
James, all types of self experience are accompanied by
corresponding emotional representations, which are the
fundamental elements of the self (James, 1890). Evidence
from depersonalization disorder can be seen as one kind
of support. However, we still need a large amount of sys-
tematic research to reveal the underling mechanism of
minimal self and narrative self.
We only observed systematic effects on anxiety are re-
stricted to plausible threats. Given that collecting coins
is likely to induce some affect and arousal, it is possible
that SCR measures would have been more sensitive to
pick up affective processes in the coin task. Further
studies would be better to adopt both questionnaire and
objective measurements.Acknowledgements
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